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Abstract – In this paper, we present the strategy of Agent 
Madoff, which is a heuristic-based negotiation agent 
competing in the upcoming Automated Negotiating 
Agents Competition (ANAC 2017). Agent Madoff is 
implemented to play the game Diplomacy, which is a 
strategic board game that mimics the situation during 
World War I. Each player represents a major European 
power which has to negotiate with other forces and win 
possession of a majority supply centers on the map. We 
propose a design architecture which consists of 3 
components: heuristic module, acceptance strategy and 
bidding strategy. The heuristic module, responsible for 
evaluating which regions on the graph are more worthy, 
considers the type of region and the number of supply 
centers adjacent to the region and return a utility value 
for each region on the map. The acceptance strategy is 
done on a case-by-case basis according to the type of the 
order by calculating the acceptance probability using a 
composite function. The bidding strategy adopts a 
defensive approach aimed to neutralize attacks and 
resolve conflict moves with other players to minimize 
our loss on supply centers.  
 
Keywords – Automated Negotiation, Multi-Issue 
Negotiation, Multi-Agent System, Diplomacy 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Negotiation is described as a process of reaching an 
agreement between two or more individuals. Technically, 
we could also treat negotiation as a distributed search 
through a space of possible agreements. This serves as 
the fundamental perspective adopted by automated 
negotiation, which agents devise algorithms to search for 
Pareto optimal deals within a given negotiation 
agreement space. Automated negotiation has been a 
growing area of research in the recent years with an 
increasing number of applications in domains such as e-
commerce, board games and even human-agent 
negotiation. 
The Automated Negotiation Agents Competition 
(ANAC) is one of the competitions which fuels research 
interest in developing practical, state-of-the-art agents 
that can negotiate under various circumstances. As it 
evolves towards a more practical approach, the latest 
ANAC 2017 introduces a new negotiation league named 
as “Negotiation Strategies for the Diplomacy Strategy 
Game”, which requires the participating agents to be able 
to negotiate over a large agreement space. Under this 
league, the Diplomacy game almost simulates how 
human individuals interact during a negotiation process. 
Hence, this is a much more surreal condition which is 
closer to the human negotiation environment, and with 
no doubt the complexity should increase significantly. 
This paper first gives an introduction of the above stated 
league by specifying how the Diplomacy game is played, 
and how negotiation is done in Diplomacy under the 
BANDANA framework. Then, it would focus on 
describing the negotiation strategy used by Agent 
Madoff, an agent implemented in accordance with the 
regulations proposed in the above stated league. In 
addition, the experimental results of the agent’s 
evaluation are provided, and further improvements that 
could be done on the agent are highlighted. 
2 MAIN CONTENT 
2.1 RULES OF ANAC 2017 
The upcoming Automated Negotiating Agents 
Competition (ANAC 2017) has implemented some 
drastic changes on its rules and regulations compared to 
the past few years [1]. The league that we are focusing 
on in this paper is called “Negotiation Strategies for the 
Diplomacy Strategy Game”, which requires participants 
to implement a negotiation algorithm on top of a ready-
made strategic module, combining both modules to form 
an agent that can play the classical Diplomacy board 
game. 
Unlike the GENIUS framework used by previous years 
of ANAC, the main differences between Diplomacy 
Game League are as follow: 
 There is no explicit formula to determine an 
agent’s utility function. No graph could be 
plotted out explicitly like scenarios in the 
GENIUS framework as before.The assumptions 
which were made in the study 
 Only heuristic approach can be used to 
estimate the value of a deal proposed and the 
value of the agent’s current utility. 
 BANDANA framework does not allow the 
agents to learn opponent’s strategy by now, 
unlike last year’s GENIUS framework 
Hence, a totally different paradigm is needed to deal with 
the BANDANA framework, however common ground 
between these two frameworks should also be found so 
that research progress in the GENIUS framework can be 
further adopted into agents developed in the BANDANA 
framework. 
  
 
2.2 THE DIPLOMACY GAME 
Diplomacy is a strategy game published by Avalon Hill 
[2] designed for 7 players. Each player represents one of 
the 7 “Great Powers in Europe” in the years prior to 
World War I, namely England, France, Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Turkey and Russia. Each player has a number of 
armies and fleets positioned on the map of Europe, and 
the goal is to conquer half of the “Supply Centers” across 
Europe, (in normal cases, more than 18 supply centers). 
Other than conquering more than 18 supply centers to 
win the game (in this case called a “solo victory”), 
players can also choose to propose draw with other 
players existing on board to “share” the victory. 
Figure 1 below shows a classical map initial setting of 
the Diplomacy game. The black dots on some of the 
provinces represents that the province is a supply center. 
 
Figure 1: Initial game setting for Diplomacy game 
At the start of the game, each powers are allocated with 
3 units (except Russia is allocated with 4 units). The 
game then iterates through 5 types of phases in the 
following order, starting from year 1901: 
 Spring phase 
 Summer phase 
 Fall phase 
 Autumn phase 
 Winter phase 
 
Hence the game will develop in the manner of “Spring 
1901, Summer 1901, Fall 1901, Winter 1901, Spring 
1902 …” and so on. In each round, all players should 
submit different types of “orders” for all of their units, 
depending on which phase they are in. 
 
2.2.1   SPRING AND FALL PHASES 
For Spring and Fall phases, each player must choose 
among the following 3 orders to be submitted for each of 
his unit: 
 A “move to” order (in BANDANA framework, 
it is implemented as an MTOOrder class) – 
where the unit tries to move from one province 
to another adjacent province. 
 A “hold” order (implemented as HLDOrder 
class) – where the unit tries to stay where it is 
by now 
 A “support move” order (implemented as 
SUPMTOOrder) – where the unit does not 
move, but gives extra strength to another unit 
that is moving towards the province adjacent 
to the current unit 
 A “support hold” order (implemented as 
SUPOrder) – where the unit does not move, 
but gives extra strength to another unit to hold 
its position on the province adjacent to the 
current unit 
If 2 or more units are to move into the same province, the 
unit which gains more support from other units can 
successfully move into the intended province. If both 
units have the same strength, then both units will bounce 
back to their original position and no one gets in. 
However, if another unit is moving into the location of 
the supporting unit, then the support order is “cut”, and 
hence unsuccessful. 
2.2.2   SUMMER AND AUTUMN PHASES 
For Summer and Autumn Phases, there may be some 
units that are “kicked out” from their original provinces 
as they are conquered by other units. These units are said 
to be “dislodged”. For such units, they should retreat to 
another province which is adjacent to its current location 
(this is also done by the “move to” order). If no such 
province exists, then the unit must be disbanded, and the 
player lost one unit. 
2.2.2   WINTER PHASES 
If a player successfully conquers a new supply center 
throughout the year, then the player is the owner of the 
supply center. If the player has more supply centers 
than units, he can build new units (either army unit or 
fleet unit) at this phase until the number of units equal 
the number of conquered supply centers. However if the 
player has more units than supply centers, then some of 
the units would be disbanded. Players who lost all his 
units will be eliminated from the game. 
 
Note that army units can only move on inland 
provinces, and fleet units can only move on sea 
provinces. There are also coastal provinces which allow 
to have 1 army unit and 1-2 fleet unit in the province at 
the same time. 
2.3 NEGOTIATION IN DIPLOMACY 
It is extremely hard for one single player to win the 
Diplomacy Game without gaining support from the other 
players, hence negotiation plays a very important role in 
this game to form alliances among players and agree on 
certain commitments and promises in order to reach each 
player’s own objective. 
Negotiation is done using the BAsic eNvironment for 
Diplomacy playing Automated Negotiating Agents 
(BANDANA) framework, which is a Java based 
  
 
framework to allow negotiation capabilities in the 
Diplomacy game [3]. Under this framework, the main 
types of deals that would be proposed by players among 
each other in Diplomacy are: 
 An order commitment: a proposal to a certain 
power to impose a certain order on a certain 
phase. For example: you may need France to 
support your move from Vienna to Galacia on 
Spring 1903. 
In BANDANA, it is implemented by a tuple,  
oc = (y, ᶲ, o)  
where y is “year”, ᶲ is either “Spring” or “Fall”, 
and o is the order object as specified before. 
 A demilitarized zone (DMZ): an agreement 
among a number of powers to not occupy (or 
move to) a province on a certain phase. For 
example: France, Germany and Italy agreed on 
not to occupy the supply centre in Belgium on 
Spring 1903. 
 
In BANDANA, it is implemented by a tuple, 
dmz = (y, ᶲ, A, B)  
where y is “year”, ᶲ is either “Spring” or “Fall”, 
A is a list of powers, B is a list of provinces 
intended to be demilitarized. 
Hence, a BasicDeal object is implemented to contain a 
list of order commitments and a list of demilitarized 
zones, as below: 
d = {List<oc>, List<dmz>} 
which is to be sent by the agents in the end of each phase 
to the corresponding powers involved in the deal to 
accept or reject it. 
In ANAC, we are required to only implement the 
negotiation algorithm of the agent and not its tactical 
module, as our algorithm will be built on top of another 
tactical module (the DBrane tactical module) to play the 
game. Moreover, the same tactical module will be used 
by other negotiation agents as well. Also in ANAC, 
promises cannot be broken. This means that if France 
previously agreed to move from Belgium to Holland, it 
cannot make another deal to move from Belgium to 
Picardy. The DBrane tactical module will always obey 
the deals made, which means the unit in Belgium will 
indeed move to Holland finally. 
As reneging on the deals isn’t allowed to be made in this 
framework, it greatly affects the strategy of the agent 
since now all agents must obey the deals made. This 
means that there is no chance for an agent to “cheat” on 
another agent to gain benefit from it. 
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the BANDANA framework is still in its early stage, 
there are limited existing literatures that fully described 
a negotiation model which suits the scenario of the 
Diplomacy game stated above, as a large number of them 
focus on implementing the tactical part of the agent 
instead of researching on the negotiation part. 
The most relevant literature would be a paper introducing 
an automated negotiation agent, the Diplominator, where 
in the paper some existing automated agents are 
introduced, though a large number of them do not have 
negotiating capabilities.  
2.4.1 DUMBBOT 
Although DumbBot is not a negotiating bot, it provides 
reference on deriving heuristics for strategies and tactics. 
It first assign values to each province which consider 
factors such as the owner of the province, their strength, 
the competitiveness of the province and the chances for 
own units to move there. Then, it implements an 
algorithm that “averages the board” so that the value of 
a certain province will also be affected by its adjacent 
province. The tactics developed by the bot will be based 
on the values of the provinces. 
Although DumbBot’s heuristic is only used for tactical 
purpose, it can still be referenced by negotiation 
algorithms because negotiation deals can only be made 
after determining a route plan on how to conquer the 
supply centers on the board. To determine such route 
plan, we may need a similar heuristic like DumbBot’s. 
2.4.2 DIPLOMAT 
Diplomat uses an economic based view of Diplomacy, 
which negotiation is used to exchange resources and the 
results of the trades are focused. A simulated “meeting” 
is also set up and powers that are involved in the deal 
undergoes an “auction” to determine the winner that 
makes the deal eventually. It also implements a part of 
strategy on deceit, but it would not be applicable to our 
bot. 
Diplomat is said to perform worse than DumbBot, 
despite its sophisticated design on the negotiation 
algorithm. However, The Market Based approach and 
the “auction” approach are still interesting and worth 
looking into further in future. 
2.4.3 THE ISRAELI DIPLOMAT 
The Israeli Diplomat is a sophisticated Diplomacy player 
which uses a multi-agent architecture designed based on 
real life war-time government structures. The ‘Prime 
Minister’ acts as the representative and opponents only 
talk to him. If needed, the Prime Minister will pass the 
suggested negotiation to another role to gain opinion 
before replying to the opponent. With such architecture, 
the task of negotiation could be split up to different 
departments, each focusing on different criteria. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Israeli Diplomat’s multi-agent architecture 
This multi-agent architecture is claimed to be very 
successful in the past, and it is truly interesting to be 
looked into further. 
2.4.4 DIPLOMINATOR 
Diplominator uses a banking protocol as its negotiation 
strategy, modelling the same idea of how banks decide 
whether or not to lend money to individuals. The key 
components of the strategy includes: 
 Utility of Cooperation - As a currency is needed in 
banking protocols, it simply uses DumbBot’s heuristic 
to calculate the destination values of all provinces, and 
uses it as the currency to measure the values of moves 
requested by other bots, in order to deduce our utility of 
cooperating with them. 
 Creditworthiness of Opposition Players – A bot 
should estimate whether the opponent is trustworthy for 
negotiation or not. A simple way to implement this is to 
count the percentage of times the opponent has assisted 
us. Another way will be to calculate the enemy factor, 
which is defined by 
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
#𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
#𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
 
When chances = 0, enemy factor equals the number of 
true attacks by the player. 
 Credit Limit - We should stop assisting opponents 
at some point until they pay us back, in case we are being 
too kind to be exploited by opponents in the end. 
 
2.4.5 ANACEXAMPLENEGOTIATOR 
ANACExampleNegotiator is a random negotiator. It first 
checks whether there are incoming messages in the 
message queue, and check what type of message it is. If 
there are proposed deals coming in, it accepts the deal on 
a 50% probability. After handling all messages, it picks 
among 10 randomly generated orders that yields the 
higher number of supply centers if obeyed by others. 
This bot shows a simple two-layered architecture which 
focus on the acceptance strategy and the bidding 
strategy, where two strategies may be loosely coupled. 
However, the framework manual did remind that 
maximizing the number of supply centers on every phase 
may not be an optimal strategy. 
2.5 AGENT STRATEGY 
We have designed Agent Madoff, which is a negotiating 
agent to participate in the upcoming Diplomacy League 
in ANAC 2017.  
The design architecture of Agent Madoff mainly consists 
of 3 components: heuristic module, acceptance strategy 
and bidding strategy. The pseudo code of the negotiate() 
method of Agent Madoff is as below: 
 
while (deadline is not reached){ 
  while(has message){ 
handle incoming message; 
if (near to deadline) break; 
  } 
  bidding strategy; 
} 
Update hostility and strength; 
 
The algorithm enters a while loop which terminates when 
the deadline is reached. Within the loop, we first handle 
incoming messages if there are any, and apply the 
acceptance strategy here. We break the loop if it is near 
to deadline to prevent opponents from flooding us with 
incoming messages. Next, we execute our bidding 
strategy to propose deals to other powers. Before the turn 
ends, we update the hostility and strength of our 
opponents to keep track of the game’s situation. 
In the following discussion, we will further describe our 
strategy according to the 3 components specified in the 
design architecture. 
2.5.1 HEURISTIC MODULE 
The heuristic module aids the agent’s decision making 
by evaluating which provinces/regions on the graph are 
more worthy, and hence have a higher utility for the 
agent to either move into it or to protect it from 
opponent’s invasion. 
 
Figure 3: Map representation around Austria (the red 
region) 
  
 
Take an example of Austria, certainly supply centers 
(with a black dot) such as Vienna, Budapest and Trieste 
have a higher utility for the power itself. However, 
although provinces like Bohemia, Galacia and Tyrolia 
are not SCs, they are crucial for Austria because they are 
adjacent to other SCs which Austria may want to 
conquer. Hence, the number of adjacent SCs should also 
be a factor of determining the actual utility of a certain 
province. 
With the idea of adjacent provinces giving influence to 
its neighbors to result in the final utility value, we 
propose a heuristic calculation as below: 
1. Initialize the utility value for each region: 1 for 
non-supply centers and 10 for supply centers. 
2. Then, we add a value of the sum of utility values 
of adjacent regions, multiplied by a discount 
factor of 0.3 to the utility value of each region. 
3. We divide the utility value by the maximum 
utility value among all regions to normalize the 
value between [0, 1]. This is because in the 
future calculation of acceptance probability it 
needs to yield a result between [0, 1], hence all 
parameters need to be normalized. 
An example will be like Figure 3 as below: 
 
Figure 4: An example of showing the utility calculation 
In Figure 4, assume that the regions in red are supply 
centers. Since B itself is a supply center, it has an initial 
utility of 10. The sum of the utility value of its adjacent 
regions are 1+10+1 = 12. Hence the final utility value of 
B is 10 + 0.3 x 12 = 13.6. Assume that utility value of A 
= 3, C = 4, D = 15, then the normalized utility value of B 
is 
13.6
15
 = 0.9067.  
For our agent, all regions would have a fixed utility value 
throughout the game. Hence, it could be pre-computed 
once the agent is initialized. 
2.5.2 ACCEPTANCE STRATEGY 
The acceptance strategy is done on a case-by-case basis 
according to the type of the order. For each type of order, 
we determine several parameters which are essential to 
the acceptance of the order. A composite function that 
takes in the parameters is derived to calculate a value 
between [0, 1], and we called it as the acceptance 
probability for that particular order. 
There are 2 types of parameters that will be frequently 
used in the evaluations below: 
(1) Hostility 
It shows the measure of friendliness of a particular power 
towards you (e.g. have they attacked you, have they 
support you before, etc.).  
Throughout the game, a hostility list is maintained. For 
each power, the hostility value is initially set to 0. If a 
power supports us, its hostility value increase by 5. If a 
power attacks us (steal our provinces), its hostility value 
is decreased by 10. The hostility value, h is normalized 
linearly: 
𝐼𝑓 ℎ < 0,  ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 0.5 ( 
ℎ − hmin
−ℎmin
) 
𝐼𝑓 ℎ ≥ 0,  ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 0.5 ( 
ℎ
ℎmax
) + 0.5 
Where ℎmin  and ℎmax  denotes the minimum and 
maximum hostility among the list. 
(2) Strength 
It means how strong the particular power is, as we argue 
that we should team up with the weaker teams to fight 
the stronger teams so that they will be a balance of power 
among all players.  
The strength of a team is determined by the number of 
SCs that they have currently conquered. In the beginning 
each team is given 3 SCs, and with 18 SCs one can 
declare a solo victory. Hence we need a mapping 
function to map values from [3, 18] to [0, 1] to represent 
its strength. In this case, the mapping function used is 
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 0.5 sin (
𝜋(#𝑆𝐶𝑠 − 9)
18
) + 0.5 
Support move order 
 
Figure 5: Support move order 
We establish 5 parameters: Supportee’s hostility, 
supportee’s strength, unit’s neediness, target’s hostility, 
target’s strength. All parameters have a value between [0, 
1]. 
Unit’s neediness, in this case, means how much is the 
army needed for my team. The higher the unit’s 
neediness, the more reluctant the unit is to support other 
  
 
unit’s move. With this, we need to know the original plan 
of the army which is available in the strategic module of 
the BANDANA framework: 
 If the army is planned to move to some other 
places, the unit’s neediness depends on the 
utility value of the intended region 
 If the army is planned to support my own team, 
unit’s neediness = 1 
 If the army is planned to support other teams, its 
neediness is higher if the supporting team is 
more friendly towards us 
 If the army is planned to just hold, unit’s 
neediness = 0.5 
With these 5 parameters, the acceptance probability is 
then equal to: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.2 × ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 0.1
× (1 − 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒) + 0.5
× (1 − 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 0.1
× 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.1
× ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  
If no unit resides in the target region, then target’s 
hostility and strength equals to 0, in this case: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.3 × ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 0.2
× (1 − 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒) + 0.5
× (1 − 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Support hold order 
 
Figure 6: Support hold order 
Support hold order works in a similar way with support 
move-to order without target node, only that the 
supportee is to hold. Hence, 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.3 × ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 0.2
× (1 − 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑒) + 0.5
× (1 − 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Move-to order 
 
Figure 7: Move-to order 
We establish 3 parameters: target’s hostility, and whether 
the new order is better (called newIsBetter below). 
newIsBetter is to determine whether moving to the 
proposed target is better than its original plan. With this, 
we check the original plan of the army.  
 We initialized newIsBetter = 0.2. 
 If the army is to hold, and the target to move in 
has a higher utility value, then newIsBetter = 
0.8; or else newIsBetter remains as 0.2. 
 If the army is planning to move to the other 
destination, we compare the utility of the 
original destination to the target region. If the 
target has a higher utility, newIsBetter = 0.8; or 
else newIsBetter remains as 0.2. 
Hence, the acceptance probability is as below: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.3 × ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.7
× 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑠𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 
If no unit resides in the target region, then target’s 
hostility equals to 0, in this case the acceptance 
probability simply equals to newIsBetter. 
Hold order 
 
Figure 8: Hold order 
We first check the unit’s original plan. 
 If its plan is to hold, simply accept the proposal. 
 If its plan is to move to another region, check 
the utility of the intended region. If the province 
has a utility greater than 0.7, reject the proposal. 
Or else, return a default probability of 0.4. This 
shows a slight reluctance to accept a hold order 
for our agent. 
  
 
 If its plan is to support other units, it is highly 
improbable to accept a hold order. Hence we 
return a probability of 0.1. 
DMZ order (demilitarized zone order) 
DMZ proposal is made between several powers such that 
all the powers agree not to invade the specified 
provinces. 
We establish 2 parameters needed: utility of the region, 
and the competitiveness of the DMZ proposal. 
The higher the utility of the region, the more reluctant we 
would demilitarize it since it is important to us. 
Competitiveness is measured by counting the number of 
powers involved in the DMZ. It is smoothen by a 
logarithm function to map the value between [0, 1]. We 
argue that the more number of powers involved, the 
harder it is for you to fight for the region if you do not 
accept the DMZ, hence the more competitive it is the 
more probable we should demilitarize the region. 
For DMZs, we check the original plan of each units and 
see which provinces we intend to move to. 
 If the DMZ zone is not within our intended 
provinces, simply accept it as it cause no harm 
to us 
 Else, we compute the acceptance probability for 
the DMZ proposal as below: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.6 × 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
+ 0.4 × (1
− 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
COMPOSITE ORDER PROPOSAL 
Proposals usually contain more than 1 type of order. For 
example, A could send a proposal to B such that A 
request B to support his move, and A will DMZ one of 
the regions in conflict with B as a return of favor. In this 
case, this proposal contains a support order and a DMZ 
order. 
For our agent, after calculating the acceptance 
probability of each order, we calculate the mean 
probability of all orders and treat it as the acceptance 
probability of the composite order proposal. Denote 
mean probability as x: 
 If x > 0.8, accept the deal; 
 If x < 0.4; reject the deal; 
 If 0.4 ≤ x ≤ 0.8, we flip a coin so that the deal 
is accepted with a probability of x. 
In addition, our agent only takes in account the proposals 
regarding the current phase only. For proposals regarding 
the future phases, we would return an acceptance 
probability of 0, as we argue that there is no reason for 
us to bind to a “virtual” agreement made for the 
unpredictable future.  
2.5.4 BIDDING STRATEGY 
Agent Madoff does not speculate moves further than the 
current phase. Hence, each proposal of the agent is done 
only according to the current phase and game setting. 
This is because binding to deals which happen in the 
future may be invalid and hence unnecessary. 
The bidding strategy that our agent adopted is a 
defensive, de-conflict strategy. It consists of 2 stages: 
neutralize the attack regions, and resolve the conflict 
regions. 
Order Calculator 
We first discuss about the “order calculator” which is 
used within the bidding strategy. By assuming that for 
each type of order, the opponent considers same 
parameters as our agent, we could use our acceptance 
strategy module to mimic an order calculator which 
calculates the acceptance probability of a power for a 
given order in its own perspective. With this, we could 
propose orders with higher acceptance probability to 
achieve a higher chance of agreement. 
Neutralizing attack regions 
The strategic module within BANDANA is able to return 
the opponent’s move given its power and the current 
game state, before negotiation is made. Hence for each 
power, we could speculate the pre-determined move of 
each of its unit. If we find that the unit’s move is to 
invade our supply center, we should neutralize the attack 
through negotiation. 
The neutralization steps are as below: 
 We generate all possible orders for the attacking 
unit, and calculate all acceptance probability of 
the orders. 
 If there exists orders which has a higher 
probability than the attacking order, we pick the 
highest one and propose it to the opponent. 
 If no alternative orders are found, we request for 
support from other powers, and propose a 
“favor returning” deal (which will be discussed 
later) to increase the chance of agreement. 
 If we have no units to move into / hold our 
supply centers, we could only ask for a DMZ 
with the attacking unit.  
Resolving conflict regions 
Since the strategic module is able to anticipate the 
opponents move given the opponent’s power and the 
current game state, we could then see if our agent’s 
moves are in conflict with other agent’s move before 
negotiation takes place. 
A “conflict” means that there are more than 1 opponent 
that want to move to a region that you intend to move 
into. If there is, then negotiation proposals are needed to 
resolve the conflict. 
  
 
 
Figure 9: Conflict move 
The resolving steps are as below: 
 For each power, we check if we have any in-
conflict moves with them. 
 We generate all possible orders for the 
opponent’s conflicting unit, and calculate all 
acceptance probability of the orders. 
 If there exists orders which has a higher 
probability than the conflict order, we pick the 
highest one and propose it to the opponent. 
 If no alternatives are found, we request for 
support from other powers, and propose a 
“favor returning” deal (which will be discussed 
later) to increase the chance of agreement. 
 We keep a DMZ deal with the opponent’s unit 
for that region as a “reservation deal” which 
will be proposed should the previous deals 
failed to be accepted. 
Return the favor 
Normally within a proposal, we would add a “favor 
returning” deal apart from a pure request of support so 
that the proposal is more likely to be accepted. In this 
case, we specify a “return credit”, which is the number 
of our units which could return the favor to the powers 
which have supported us. This is to prevent most of our 
units being used for returning the favor, which further 
weakens our strength. We allow 1/3 of the total number 
of units that we currently have to be our “return credit”. 
We propose 2 ways to return the favor to our supporters: 
 By supporting its move: we search for units 
situated adjacent to the power’s army’s adjacent 
neighbors, as shown in the top part of the 
diagram above. If there is, and if the neighbor 
(region A as in Figure 9) has a very high utility 
for the power, we could propose to support the 
power to move into A in return. 
 
Figure 10: Return the favor by support move-to order 
 By supporting it to hold: some units may want 
to hold their position to prevent invasion into 
their regions by other powers. If we have a unit 
which is adjacent to the supporter’s unit, we 
could support them to hold. 
 
Figure 11: Return the favor by support hold order 
3 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first introduce the new Diplomacy 
league in ANAC and observe how negotiation is 
implemented in the league using the BANDANA 
framework. We give a review on existing Diplomacy 
agents, which provide useful ideas for us to implement 
an efficient agent. We present the design of Agent 
Madoff, whose architecture comprises of 3 main 
components: the heuristic module, acceptance strategy 
and bidding strategy. Our agent is submitted to 
participate in ANAC 2017 Diplomacy league, and the 
results are forthcoming. 
Future work will focus on improving each of the 
modules: for the heuristic module, we could adopt a 
dynamic model which changes according to the game 
situation instead of the current static model; for the 
acceptance strategy, the parameters could be adjusted to 
further mimic the thought process of a human agent 
making negotiation decisions.; for the bidding strategy, 
it could be improved to search for tempting bids that are 
more likely to be accepted by the opponents. Instead of 
adopting a defensive strategy, we could also propose 
deals to form attacks and arrange battle plans against our 
opponents, acting as a real diplomat during war. 
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